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Dec 30

Challenges in Deploying Long-Context Transformers: A Theoretical Peak Performance Analysis

Transformer-based long context generative models power emerging AI applications like hour-long video understanding and project-level coding agent. Deploying long context transformers (e.g., 100K to 10M tokens) is prohibitively expensive compared to short context (e.g., 4K tokens) model variants. Reducing the cost of long-context transformers is becoming a pressing research and engineering challenge starting from the year of 2024. This work describes a concurrent programming framework for quantitatively analyzing the efficiency challenges in serving multiple long-context requests under limited size of GPU high-bandwidth memory (HBM) regime. We give a detailed analysis of how all additional computational costs, compared to 4K context, trace back to one single source: the large size of the KV cache. We use a 34B GPT-3.5 level model of 50K context on A100 NVLink as a running example, and describe how its large KV cache causes four types of deployment challenges: (1) prefilling long inputs takes much longer compute time and GPU memory than short inputs; (2) after prefilling, the large KV cache residing on the GPU HBM substantially restricts the number of concurrent users being served; (3) during decoding, repeatedly reading the KV cache from HBM to SM largely increases latency; (4) when KV cache memory overflows, swapping it from HBM to DDR causes significant context switching latency. We use this framework to analyze existing works and identify possibilities of combining them to build end-to-end systems. Overall, this work offers a foundational framework for analyzing long context transformer deployment and identifies directions towards reducing the inference cost of 1M context to be as cheap as 4K.

  • 1 authors
·
May 14, 2024

Architectural Backdoors for Within-Batch Data Stealing and Model Inference Manipulation

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.

  • 4 authors
·
May 23 2